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Abstract
The European Union (EU) has exerted a powerful influence over the international system.
Often overlooked is that this influence has not always operated in the manner the architects
and admirers of the EU might have hoped. Instead, the diffusion of European norms and the
policy transfer of the EU model of regional integration is mediated by triangular processes
in Asia of (1) selective rule-taking, (2) translation and adaption, and (3) modifying external




For decades the European Union has represented the benchmark against which
all other inter-governmental regional projects were measured. The EU has been
a remarkably successful experiment in transforming the basis of inter-state rela-
tions. Had this project remained confined to part of Western Europe it would
still have represented an unprecedented transformation of transitional gover-
nance in a region formerly steeped in conflict and a potential role model for the
rest of the world. The key question we want to consider here is whether the EU
was a model that could be emulated by other regions. More to the point, was the
*The authors would like to thank the GR:EEN Consortium, the European Commission’s
Framework ProgrammeNo. 7,
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‘Global Re-Ordering: Evolution through EuropeanNetworks’
project that provided support for the development of this paper.
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model and normative project attractive to other regions and powers with very
different histories and modes of governance?
To address this question we consider the EU’s relations with, and impact on,
East Asia, a region developing a growing number of regional institutions of
its own and experiencing a remarkable process of economic development. The
change in the relative economic fortunes of the EU and East Asia forms an
important backdrop to the possible attractiveness of the EU model. However,
our analysis will focus on the period before the current crisis when there was an
expectation—inEurope at least—that other parts of theworld hadmuch to learn
from the European exemplar.1 However, the degree and type of policy transfer
from, and institutional emulation of, Europe that has actually taken place within
East Asia has been limited. In part, this is a consequence of East Asia’s distinc-
tive political, economic and strategic history. In part, however, this constriction
of emulation can be ascribed to the ineffectiveness of the transfer mechanisms
as well as the disjuncture between the proposed model and empirical realities in
Asia. Accordingly, we extend the conceptual parameters of the policy transfer lit-
erature by connecting to the notions of policy translation and norm localisation.
Importantly, the concept of ‘region’ is polysemous: it means different things
to different groups and communities whereby region-building takes dramatically
different forms around theworld.2 Weargue that formany contemporary policy-
makers and thinkers inAsia the European experience is not an attractive, feasible
or appropriate model. The EU’s capacity to influence outcomes in Asia has—
in the postcolonial period—been limited and is likely to decline further in the
aftermath of the recent crisis which has had a relatively limited impact on East
Asia.3 First, we provide a snapshot of the historical and political factors that have
limited European influence in East Asia. The second section considers the con-
temporary influence of the European regional model as an outward diffusion of
norms, practices and institutions. For policy transfer and ideational influence to
eventuate, specific institutional mechanisms need to be developed and have to
operate in a receptive environment; we suggest neither of these conditions have
generally been present in East Asia. We conclude by considering what effect the
recent European crisis may have in inter-regional relations.
1) Antje Jetschke and Philomena Murray, ‘Diffusing regional integration: the EU and South-
east Asia’, West European Politics, Vol. 35 (2012), pp. 174–191.
2) Luk Van Langenhove, Building Regions: The Regionalization of the World Order (Surrey:
Ashgate, 2011), p. 1.
3) Shaun Breslin, ‘East Asia and the global/transatlantic/Western crisis’, Contemporary Poli-
tics, Vol. 17 (2011), pp. 109–117.
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Asian Paths of (In)Dependence
Although the EU generally did not try to promote itself as a model that should
be adopted around theworld, it did assume that it represented an effectivemodel
of governance that other countries might want to emulate.4 Many European
opinion leaders have been surprised, both by their own problems and by the fact
that its model of governance has not been more influential. Yet the history of
relations betweenAsia andEurope suggests they oughtnot tohave been: colonial
relations were often soaked in blood and driven by powerful commercial and
strategic interests that have left a complex social, political and institutional legacy
in their wake. The impact of imperialism on China and elsewhere in the region,
signals the importance of ‘path dependency’ when thinking about the way the
East Asian region has evolved institutionally.
The Historical Legacy
History matters. While this is true of Europe, East Asia has tended to be on the
receiving end of the historical forces that have made the modern world.5 Being
an historical rule-taker is neither as agreeable nor as advantageous as being a rule-
maker. European imperialism profoundly changed the entire East Asian region.
The institutional architecture, economic practices and social relations of con-
temporary East Asia were frequently ‘made in Europe’, even if they are distin-
guishedby contingent features that reflect earlier patterns of organisation.What-
ever the merits of the nation-state as the default political option or a broadly
market-based system as the basis for global economic activity, they were often
realised in brutal and undignified circumstances. The ‘century of humiliation’
China endured at the hands of the Europeans still rankles and profoundly influ-
ences the attitudes of elite policy-makers and ordinary Chinese alike.6
There is a clear sense among contemporary political elites in China that they
are finally re-establishing themselves where China has been for most of recorded
human history: as the dominant force in regional, if not global, affairs.7 Most
4) European Commission, Communication from the Commission—European Community
Support for Regional Economic Integration Effort among Developing Countries, COM (95) 219
final, (Brussels: EC, 1995), p. 8.
5) DavidAbernathy,GlobalDominance: EuropeanOverseas Empires, 1415–1980 (NewHaven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
6) Alison Kaufman, ‘The “century of humiliation”, then and now: Chinese perceptions of the
international order’, Pacific Focus, Vol. 25 (2010), pp. 1–33.
7) Deng Yong, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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Southeast Asia states remain concerned with protecting domestic sovereignty,
and are consequently preternaturally sensitive about possible infringements on
domestic autonomy.8 Southeast Asian states are still comparatively recent prod-
ucts of decolonisation; theywere born in a fraught geopolitical environment and
havehad to create nation-states, identities and functioning economies in an inter-
national system dominated by extant European powers and, more recently, the
US.
What we now think of as ‘East Asia’ was then, as now, the epicentre of epochal
struggles to define a new world order. Although the US’s hegemonic presence in
Europe provided a catalyst for European integration, in Asia it had precisely the
opposite effect. The ‘hub and spoke’ strategic architecture that the US created
in Asia effectively foreclosed any possibility of region-wide integration and/or
cooperation until the 1990s.9 Europe and Asia have had very different, institu-
tionally embedded experiences and these have inevitably influenced the attitudes
of policy-makers and the course of subsequent regional integration on both con-
tinents.
Two important comparative points are worth emphasising. First, at the na-
tional level, particularly in Southeast Asia, there is less state capacity with which
to develop and/or implement policy—a consequence of colonialism cultivating
weak indigenous political structures.10 The resultant prevalence of authoritar-
ian regimes in postcolonial Southeast Asia was notable. In Northeast Asia, by
contrast, the highly successful process of industrialisation in Japan, Korea and
Taiwan was led by powerful state bureaucracies. Second, Japan also bequeathed
a powerful set of institutions and state practices to Korea and Taiwan during
its own colonial period. Japan’s own response to European colonial expansion
reminds us that different responses are possible to similar challenges: Japan ac-
tively sought and adopted European technology and organisational principles.
The key point of this historical snapshot is that East Asia is a complex place,
replete with states of very different capabilities and ordering principles, but one
that shares some important historical legacies. These help to explain its very
different course of regional institutional development.
8) Lee Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2012).
9) M. Beeson, ‘Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative historical per-
spective’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6 (2005), pp. 969–985.
10) Shamsul Haque, ‘Theory and practice of public administration in Southeast Asia: tradi-
tions, directions, and impacts’, International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 30 (2007),
pp. 1297–326.
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Regionalism Asian Style
Nowadays a cliché, the EU is sui generis and not necessarily the inevitable end-
point of regional processes elsewhere. Nevertheless, regional development in
Asia is very different in both its organising principles and its ultimate goals.
The first regional organisation of significance—the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)—was established to shore up the sovereignty, stabilise
intra-regional relations and generally enhance the standing of the region’s newly
independent, vulnerable-looking and insecure states.11 ASEAN was intention-
ally designed not to replicate the EU model of sovereignty pooling. Moreover,
unlike the European Commission, ASEAN’s secretariat has been small, rela-
tively powerless and unable to infringe on the jealously guarded sovereignty of
its members.12
Nevertheless, ASEAN itself has played a surprisingly prominent part in the
wider East Asian region’s institutional development. The much-discussed
ASEAN Way is the central focus of analysis in this context. Its admirers suggest
that not only are there distinctive regional practices based on voluntarism and
consensus, but international norms are also adapted and redefined by regional
actors. Amitav Acharya argues that local actors:
do not remain passive targets and learners as transnational agents, acting out of a uni-
versal moral script to produce and direct norm diffusion in world politics. Local agents
also promote norm diffusion by actively borrowing and modifying transnational norms
in accordance with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices.13
Interpretation and adaptation is required for international ‘best practice’ or over-
seas models to be effectively transplanted and take root. The other question,
which is especially pertinent to the EU, is whether external ideational influences
will inevitably be transformed or watered down by contingent social and institu-
tional realities.
Modelling Europe
Theparadox of Asian regional institutionalisation is that, despite its comparative
feebleness, there is a plethora of institutions vying for attention. Consequently,
11) Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rien-
ner, 2002).
12) Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and
Prospects (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
13) Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and insti-
tutional change in Asian regionalism’, International Organization, Vol. 58 (2004), p. 269.
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the EU’s officially designated mechanism for engagement with Asia—the Asia–
Europe Meeting (ASEM)—has found it hard to attract attention at the best of
times.The Meeting risks losing traction as Europe becomes preoccupied with its
own problems andEuropean patterns of regionalism lose their attractiveness and
authority.
An influential school of thought contends that the EU has simply to exist to
exert a normative power that ‘changes the norms, standards and prescriptions
of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity’.14 Even
before the recent crisis such views looked premature.Aswehave suggested,much
of Asia is still enthusiastically reinforcing state sovereignty in a region where
effective state capacity has often been in short supply and Westphalian modes
of governance are still very much in fashion.
More mundane impediments to European influence existed well before the
current crisis. Part of the EU’s problem in becoming an influential interlocu-
tor with Asia is because ‘when it comes to Asia, there is no self-evident “it” to
relate to’.15 The same criticism can be made of the EU: not only has its capac-
ity to develop a coherent, institutionalised foreign policy position been notori-
ously deficient, but its overall diplomatic culture and policy-making is a ‘fluid,
dynamic, contested and often contradictory process of negotiation, interpreta-
tion and practice’.16 The EU needs both a capacity to act effectively and some-
thing to act upon.
When it comes to developing a regional identity or expression of region-
ally based collective purpose, both the EU and Asia have similar weaknesses.
In East Asia’s case, coherence and the capacity for collective action (or emula-
tion) has been further undermined by an absence of the sort of formal legal-
ism that historically gave the EU a greater degree of internal consistency.17 The
other key difference between the two regions, however, is that Asian states have
not had great expectations about what such collective endeavours can achieve,
and have actively sought to avoid entangling themselves in binding commit-
ments over which they have no national control. Asian states have either resisted
14) Ian Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs, Vol. 84
(2008), pp. 45–60, p. 45.
15) Michael Smith and Natee Vichitsorasatra, ‘The European Union’s Asia strategies: prob-
lems of foreign policy and international relations’, International Politics, Vol. 47 (2010), pp.
338–354, p. 341.
16) Maureen Benson-Rea and Chris Shore, ‘Representing Europe: the emerging “culture” of
EU diplomacy’, Public Administration, Vol. 90 (2012), p. 485.
17) PeterKatzenstein, AWorld of Regions: Asia andEurope in the American Imperium (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
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legally binding agreements of the sort that distinguish the EU, or sought to use
them opportunistically where it suits national interests.18
Suchpre-existing factors have the potential to act as barriers toEuropean influ-
ence. Not only are there deep-seated, unresolved historical tensions between
some of East Asia’s most powerful states, but the very internal borders of the
region remain disputed and a source of potential conflict. Lingering geopolit-
ical problems and concerns about territorial integrity and political autonomy
explain East Asia’s preoccupation with sovereignty as something that states seek
to reinforce rather than pool. Equally importantly, despite a recent surge of inter-
est in regional institutional development,19 East Asia still has a relatively limited
transnational political infrastructurewithwhich to replicate European-style gov-
ernance practices.
East Asia, therefore, serves as a challenging test of the efficacy of the diffu-
sion of the EU model. We also suggest there has been an erroneous tendency of
much of the European scholarly discussion to consider the success or effective-
ness of Asian regional integration in terms of hard institutional transfer and an
organisational mirroring of the de jure legalistic processes characteristic of the
EU model. This has led to a short-sightedness of other policy transfer dynamics:
on the one hand, soft transfers of European norms and ideas that were subject to
selective andnegotiateduptake in transformative processes of translation.On the
other hand, instead of an unmediated andmechanical bilateral exchange fromA
to B—Europe to Asia—policy transfer involves learning from many exemplars
to take away a multiplicity of lessons. Finally, policy transfer can also entail neg-
ative lesson-drawing, a dynamic that needs greater consideration in the various
pathways of Asian regional integration.
Transferring Regionalism?
Policy transfer concepts have long been associated with the Europeanisation
literature.20 Policy transfer is applied knowledge of policies, administrative pro-
cedures, institutions or ideas transported from one political jurisdiction to help
devise policies, administrative procedures or institutions in another domain.21
In this section we move from the macro-level and historical context to address
18) Miles Kahler, ‘Legalization as a strategy: theAsia-Pacific case’, International Organization,
Vol. 54 (2000), pp. 549–571.
19) Christopher Dent, East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2008).
20) David Benson and Andrew Jordan, ‘What have we learnt from policy transfer research?’
Political Studies Review, Vol. 9 (2011), pp. 366–378.
21) Diane Stone, ‘Transfer and translation of policy’, Policy Studies, Vol. 33 (2012), pp. 1–17.
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mechanisms and processes, at the meso-level, of European norm advocacy of its
regional model with Asia. In short, we shift analytical gears. In doing so, we
stretch the policy transfer framework to take better account of translation and
selective reception of norms.22 We do not posit uni-directional Europe-transfer-
to-Asia that has characterised some of the European literature.23 Nor dowe limit
our critique to suggesting that the processes of transfer of the EU model are sim-
ply imperfect, unevenorpartial transfer. Instead,we relocate agency anddetermi-
nation to the importing context of EastAsia and argue there have been triangular
processes of (1) selective rule-taking, (2) translation and adaption, and (3) devi-
ation or disdaining models from elsewhere by asserting alternative visions and
models.
TheEuropeanUnionhas often been described as a ‘laboratory for policy trans-
fer’ given gradual convergence among member states. EU processes of region-
alisation propel patterns of increasing similarity in economic, social and polit-
ical organisation between countries. The mimetic institutional isomorphism of
organisations is explained as resulting from entrenched path dependencies and
the taken-for-granted aspects of political life where actors follow rules, shared
interpretations, schema and meanings. Member and candidate states converge
around harmonising policies: structural funds, cohesion funds and the acquis
communautaire. The European Commission is a top-down influence for com-
pliance through directives and regulations as well as joint progress on policy
through the benchmarking, best methods andmonitoring practices of theOpen
Method of Coordination. This is more a process of EU-isation (rather than the
broader social and cultural process of Europeanisation) that occurs internally
within the EU as a combination of coercive measures and voluntary harmoni-
sation.
‘Europeanisation’ is a transfer fromEurope to other jurisdictions either of pol-
icy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms.24 ‘EU-isation’ is a more
specific political process, a set of regulative rules, ordinarily considered as some-
thing within Europe rather than as an objective of European foreign policy.
EU-isation explains domestic adaptation to European integration via the EU:
that is, ‘the domestic impact of the EU, and/or the domestic impact on the EU,
22) Noemi Lendvai and Paul Stubbs, ‘Policies as translation: situating transnational social
policies’, in S. Hodgson and Z. Irving (eds), Policy Reconsidered: Meanings, Politics and Prac-
tices (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007).
23) Tanja Börzel andThomas Risse,TheDiffusion of (Inter-)Regionalism.TheEU as aModel of
Regional Integration, KFG Working Papers (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2009); Jetschke
and Murray, ‘Diffusing regional integration’.
24) Trine Flockhart, ‘Europeanization or EU-ization? The transfer of European norms across
time and space’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 48 (2010), pp. 787–810.
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increasingly differentiated as “uploading” and “downloading” ’ whereby ‘Mem-
ber States and prospective Member States adopt EU rules and implement EU
policy-making’.25 Nevertheless, the EU ‘exporting forms of political organisa-
tion’ has been identified as one element of EU-isation. The modelling of the
African Union upon the EU can be considered an example of EU-isation, other-
wise called ‘self-replication’.26 Mercosur was modelled on European integration,
although its structure of internal governance is different from and more fragile
than the EU.27
Our approach is to address bothEuropeanisation andEU-isation as linked but
distinguishable. As noted, both processes can be considered a normative ‘export’
from the EuropeanUnion through bodies such as ASEM (and its institution the
Asia Europe Foundation) or the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy (ENP) as well
as more generally through European foreign policy, including national foreign
policy of EU member states.
The selective voluntary convergence of a number of states outside the EU
but inside theNeighbourhood suggests that geographic proximity and/or asym-
metric market interdependence is one factor in explanations of convergence.28
The desire and incentives for EU membership form another compelling factor
for convergence. However, these centrifugal forces cannot be so easily extrapo-
lated to East Asia, or elsewhere where countries are neither eligible for EUmem-
bership nor desirous of it. Indeed, it has become increasingly apparent that for
the EU to exert an influence—even over its more immediate neighbours and
prospectivemembers—there needs to be a domestic constituency pushing in the
same general direction.29 This is a potentially fatal handicap: not only can it not
be assumed that progressive political forces exist to support transnational goals,
but Asian states are better equipped to withstand EU reformist pressures than
25) Flockhart, ‘Europeanization or EU-ization?’, p. 789.
26) Toni Haastrup, ‘EU as mentor? Promoting regionalism as external relations practice
in EU–Africa relations’, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 35 (2013), DOI: 10.1080/
07036337.2012.744754.
27) Jean Grugel, ‘Democratization and ideational diffusion: Europe, Mercosur and social cit-
izenship’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45 (2007), pp. 43–68.
28) For example, on Central Asian emulation of Bologna process principles, see Peter Jones,
‘Regulatory regionalism and education: the European Union in Central Asia’, Societies and
Education, Vol. 8 (2010), pp. 59–85. On Ukrainian harmonisation to EU standards in the
transportation policy field, see TomCasier, ‘To adopt or not to adopt: explaining selective rule
transfer under the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 33
(2011), p. 42.
29) Mario Telò, ‘European Union, regionalism, new multilateralism: three scenarios’, in M.
Telò (ed.), European Union and New Regionalism (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 297–326.
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other parts of the world such as Africa.30 As has been the case in Mercosur, EU
policy towards Asia appears to be premised on a ‘positive identity relationship
with governing elites’ whereby the normative features of region construction are
presumed to be accepted and understood by Asian leaders.31 We suggest that
those specific lessons that may have been taken of European institutional pro-
cesses are for instrumental reasons, and not as a case of normative convergence.
Taking an analytical vantage from Europe, the relevant question then be-
comes: what are the strategies and instruments at the disposal of the EU in
the absence of membership incentives and accession conditionalities?32 EU self-
replication as a model has at least three dimensions:
First, the EU promotes its model of regionalism to other regions. It proposes regional
economic and market integration and the establishment of supranational organizations
as pathways to peace and welfare in other parts of the world … Second … the EU is
often known to propagate a ‘neoliberal’ economic model, which reflects the EU’s inter-
nal commitment to market-building and economic liberalization … [or] for a multilat-
erally managed ‘regulatory framework for liberal markets’. Third, the EU promotes con-
stitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy in its external
relations.33
Only the first modality is uniquely European and points towards EU-isation.
While the propagation of neo-liberal economicmodels, or constitutional norms,
maywell be transmittedwith a distinctly Europeanflavour, suchnorm-brokerage
is also undertaken by other international actors.
This process of export can be driven by the EUor bymember countries. Direct
enticement can take the form of incentives for foreign governments to follow
EU procedures via aid, market access or institutional ties. Although the EU
is a very significant trade partner for much of East Asia, the EU is becoming
relatively less significant because of the growth of intra-Asian trade, increasingly
centred on China.34 The EU’s own growing economic problems mean that the
30) Mary Farrell, ‘EU policy towards other regions: policy learning in the external promotion
of regional integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16 (2009), pp. 1165–1184,
p. 1179.
31) Grugel, ‘Democratization’, p. 44.
32) Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization beyond Europe’, Living Reviews in European
Governance, Vol. 4 (2009), pp. 1–28; available at: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-3
(accessed 31 March 2013).
33) Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization’, p. 10.
34) Anne Polet-Fort and Yeo Lay Hwee, EU–Asia Trade Relations: Getting Through the Crisis
(Brussels: FRIDE, 2012); available at: http://www.fride.org/publication/974/eu-asia-trade
-relations:-getting-through-the-crisis (accessed 31 March 2013).
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possibility of using economic leverage or the success of the European model as a
template for others is also likely to diminish.
Indirect socialisation strategies, both official and non-state, supposedly teach
the ideas and norms underlying EU policies to outsiders in order to persuade
them that these policies are appropriate and effective.35 That foreign govern-
ments and policy elites learn these ideas and norms, and subsequently adopt
similar policies, is seen as a compelling and logical evolution towards conver-
gence. Noted earlier, another consideration is that the mere ‘presence’ of the EU
has had an indirect and unanticipated influence on third countries that adjust
their policies or procedures, as not to do so could entail costs. Firms wanting to
operate in the EU market often need to adopt EU rules and product standards
owing to asymmetrical interdependence. Such Euro-centric explanations fail to
account for the high degree of variation and selective rule adoption in the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood36 and beyond.
Official promotionof theEUas amodel of regional integration emanates from
theCommission, the Parliament and various other EU-funded initiatives.Mech-
anisms range from public exhortations of Romano Prodi in 2000 that the EU
model is an ‘export item’37 to inter-regional partnership agreements like the Joint
Africa–EUStrategy.38TheAsia–EuropeMeeting is the dialogue vehicle forman-
aging Europe–Asia relations and issues of common concern.39 Schemes such as
Erasmus Mundus are more indirect and long term but provide material incen-
tives via generous scholarships in Europe for those the EU hopes will be future
political and economic leaders around theworld andwill become favourably dis-
posed to the European project.40
Non-state diffusion vehicles are too numerous to recount but include Europe’s
World, an independent news agency.41 Now independent of its parent, the Asia–
Europe Journal was launched in 2003 by ASEF. Various think-tanks, univer-
sity institutes and research centres have provided both constructive and criti-
cal commentary on the European model.42 One European Policy Centre study
35) Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization’, p. 8.
36) Casier, ‘To adopt or not’, pp. 37–53.
37) Notre Europe, available at: http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/axes/europe-and-world
-governance/projects/projet/the-european-union-as-a-reference-point-for-other-regions-of
-the-world/ (accessed 31 March 2013).
38) Haastrup, ‘EU as mentor?’, p. 2011.
39) Alfredo C. Robles, The Asia–Europe Meeting: The Theory and Practice of Interregionalism
(London: Routledge, 2008).
40) Jones, ‘Regulatory regionalism’.
41) Europe’s World: http://www.europesworld.org (accessed 31 March 2013).
42) See, inter alia, the studies emanating from bodies such Notre Europe in Paris, FRIDE in
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concludes that ‘EU-style integration cannot serve as a role model for Asia and
Asian integration’,43 whereas its Director of Research has often stated that the
EU regional model is ‘the only game in town’.44 KFG: Transformative Power
Europe at the FreieUniversität Berlin is themost apt example of university-based
research into the EU ‘as a model for effective and legitimate governance to be
emulated by other countries and regions’.45 This vibrant debate on ‘Europeani-
sation beyond Europe’46 is conducted by individual scholars from independent
institutions but is also intellectually incentivised by the Commission’s Frame-
work programmes for research and networks of excellence. For instance, both
euGRASP and GR:EEN, research projects under Framework Programme 7 of
the European Commission, address the role of the EU as a global and regional
actor,47 with some specific studies of the EU as a model. To reiterate, these pro-
grammes encompass differing and sometimes sceptical perspectives on the status
of the EU as the most sophisticated role model of regional integration. More-
over, these cultural and intellectual dimensions of Europeanisation are easier to
transmit but also more intangible and diffuse in their impact.
The analytical vantage point of this section started with a European set of
lenses, an implicit Euro-centrism putting Europe as the geopolitical and eco-
nomic centre. That is, that policy initiative and innovation on region-building
has emanated from the EU moving outwards to surrounding states and other
regions. Moreover, Europeanisation has been a strong and compelling force for
convergence promoting at least a rhetorical interest of political, economic and
intellectual elites in themodel (or elements of it) in other parts of the world. For
instance, there is some ‘organisational mirroring’ of the EU in constructing the
African Union.48 Such an orientation presents a one-way projection, from core
Madrid or the EuropeanCouncil on Foreign Relations, as well as the agendas of Commission-
supported research networks like the Mercury project (http://www.mercury-fp7.net/, ac-
cessed 31 March 2013).
43) Alexi Berkofsky,Comparing EU and Asian Integration Processes—The EU a RoleModel for
Asia? (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005), p. 17.
44) Comments at two EU-funded workshops, 13 February 2012 and 2 August 2012.
45) KFG Transformative Power Europe Research Area 3: Comparative Regionalism and Eu-
rope’s External Relations; available at: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/
transformeurope/forschung/forschungsbereich_3/index.html (accessed 22 March 2013).
46) See, for example, ‘From Europeanisation to diffusion’, thematic issue of West European
Politics (December 2011).
47) GR:EEN is Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks; see: http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/green/; and euGRASP is Changing Multilateralism: The
EU as a Global–Regional Actor in Security and Peace; see: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/csgr/green/ (accessed 31 March 2013).
48) Haastrup, ‘EU as mentor?’
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to periphery, of the European model to recipient states within evolving regions.
The next section adopts a different vantage point, andmore of an East Asian per-
spective, to suggest that successful norm-brokerage and importation also requires
norms and practices to be actively adopted.
Lost in Translation? European Diffusion and Asian Divergences
The ‘power of global models’—whether it be liberalism or democracy—can be
persuasive.49However, suchprocesses are not inevitable. Some state architectures
can be more porous to diffusion than others.50 This may result from numerous
contextual factors that create a dynamic for divergence. Thus, many examples
of best practice may exist and may be advocated inside and outside a social
system, but ignored owing to resourcing issues and time constraints in policy
development and political sensitivities as well as disinclination to look for global
models. East Asia’s overall resistance to the sort of economic reforms that have
been advocated by the international financial institutions is a striking example:
even when they were most vulnerable to institutional coercion during the Asian
financial crisis, in reality Asian states engaged in ‘mock compliance’.51
The weak institutional framework of, inter alia, ASEM and vague policy ob-
jectives around (non-state) brokering of Europeanisation limits the potential
impact of European ideas, norms and policies in Asia. Norm brokerage by Euro-
pean politicians and EU civil servants also takes shape in quite different policy
discourses alongside the advocacy undertaken by NGOs, think-tanks and uni-
versity centres. These multiple and different story lines of Europeanisation also
offer an explanation for lite convergence aroundbroadpolicy objectives andprin-
ciples but considerable scope for interpretation andpolicy deviationswith regard
to the instruments adopted, type of legislation or institutional modes of policy
control and delivery.Moreover, the variousmodalities of diffusion create further
potential for deviation and varying degrees of transfer.
First, transfer can occur at the broad level of transferring policy ideals or goals.
Here the focus is on achieving a common outcome. The route by which polities
seek such objectives can differ dramatically. It is already captured in internal EU
arrangements via the principle of subsidiarity. For Asian states, as we discussed
49) Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons and Geoffrey Garrett, ‘The global diffusion of public poli-
cies: social construction, coercion, competition, or learning’, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.
33 (2007), pp. 449–472, p. 450.
50) Stone. ‘Transfer and translation’, p. 2.
51) Andrew Walter, Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards (Ith-
aca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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in the earlier section on ‘Regionalism Asian Style’, the pursuit of regional inte-
gration deviates in method, pace and institutionalisation to create a distinct ‘soft
regionalism’. ASEAN was intentionally designed not to replicate the EU model
of sovereignty pooling but nevertheless represents a form of regional integration.
Second, there can be a transfer of institutions. It involves the creation of sim-
ilar structures such as the adoption of similar constitutional apparatus or the
transfer of education or pensions systems or the hard institutional transfers of
the EU regional model. Institutional transfer is evident in the tendency of the
EU to design its policies for, and conclude agreements with, regional groupings
of countries rather than with individual states.52 In this context, the emergence
of ASEM is a result of the need of Asian states to engage cooperatively with a
powerful region in their collective international relations. ASEM is a ‘dialogue
mechanism’. The official discourse of the Meeting is not one of policy transfer
fromEurope to Asia. Instead, the language is one of equal partnership and coop-
eration where the exchange of ideas can flow as much from Asia to Europe. Nev-
ertheless, in its self-depiction as a ‘policy-making laboratory’, ASEM says it ‘facil-
itates some transfer of technology to Asian countries who have shown interest in
the European regional integration developments’.53 Even so, there is no EU-style
dense institutional infrastructure in East Asia which might provide mechanisms
for policy transfer.54
ASEM’s development can be construed as symptomatic of a general EU bias
towards multilateralism on the one hand, and as a potential institutional mecha-
nism for the EU to externalise its internal policy processes. However, the EU has
not realised the potential of what is arguably its most important inter-regional
mechanism.As JulieGilsonpoints out, ‘theEUhasnever really been interested in
East Asia, despite the rhetoric, and has failed to put either its money or its diplo-
matic heavyweights where its pronouncements lie’.55 In other words, the failure
of institutional transfer in this case lies at least as much with the sender as the
recipient.
Third, regulatory, administrative or judicial tools can be transferred. Not only
the EU, bodies like the OECD and the multilateral banks have in more con-
certed fashion launched different instruments for cross-national learning, such
52) Farrell, ‘EU policy towards other regions’.
53) ASEM Achievements; see: http://www.aseminfoboard.org/component/k2/item/10
.html?Itemid=245nu-achievements.html (accessed 31 March 2013).
54) M.Beeson, ‘Globalization, governance, and the political-economy of public policy reform
inEastAsia’,Governance—an International Journal of Policy andAdministration, Vol. 14,No. 4
(2001), pp. 481–502.
55) Julie Gilson, ‘The Asia–Europe Meeting’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (eds), The
Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 396.
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as benchmarking, peer review, checklists and facilitated coordination. The EU
attempts to use ASEM ‘as a lobby for the modification of the legislation of
Asian participants’.56 Illustrative is an ASEM Conference on the Harmoniza-
tion of Biofuels Standards and Application to Vehicle Technologies in 2011. The
event was a forum for ‘sharing of ideas and best practices among industry mem-
bers, experts and government to provide a benchmarkwherein individual ASEM
member countries can push their own respective biofuel programmes’.57 A great
deal of selective transfer and pragmatic adaptation of international or Euro-
pean standards takes place. The case of biofuels, more generally, is also illustra-
tive because the EU approach is not the only model to heed but competes with
an international multi-stakeholder industry–NGO certification regime around
palm oil.58 Best practice does not only come from Europe.
The fourth dimension is the transfer of ideas and ideologies as inputs to pol-
icy development. A broad category, such transfers are difficult to map but are
intuitively known.The reformprecepts of the (post)WashingtonConsensus and
new public management ideas were actively disseminated around the world and
also shared features of ideational potency and, more to the point, recognisable
methods of operationalisation in the formof privatisation, structural adjustment
policies and internal markets. EU democracy promotion, by contrast, has often
beendescribed as highon rhetoric and lowonpolicy. Evenwhere theEUthought
there might be a possibility of cultivating Asian allies in support of its overarch-
ing goals, it was unable to do so: ‘there was still very much a “Europe versus Asia”
rather than “democracies versus non-democracies” divide’.59 For example, Euro-
pean discord over Myanmar’s human rights record nearly derailed the 1998 and
2004ASEMsummits.60WithinASEM,discussionof human rights is not part of
the formal agenda. Instead, owing toAsian political sensitivities on human rights
issues there is informal, civil society ‘non-confrontational debate’ promoted by
the French and Swedish sponsors in an attempt at ‘bottom-up socialisation’.61
56) Robles, The Asia–Europe Meeting, p. 93.
57) ASEM Conference on the Harmonization of Biofuels Standards; see: http://www
.aseminfoboard.org/component/rsevents/event/245-asem-conference-on-the
-harmonization-of-biofuels-standards-and-application-to-vehicle-technologies.html (ac-
cessed 31 March 2013).
58) Helen Nesadurai, ‘External responses to European “leadership” on climate change and
bio-fuels’, paper in progress.
59) Richard Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediter-
ranean and Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 131.
60) Robles, The Asia–Europe Meeting, p. 2.
61) Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights; see: http://www.asef.org/index.php/
projects/programmes/533-informal-asem-seminar-on-human-rights (accessed 31 March
2013).
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Perhaps the most telling indicator of the EU’s lack of influence has been its
inability to influence the behaviour of China. Even before the recent crisis, the
EU’s admonitions about the importance of ‘good governance’ were studiously
ignored.62 More fundamentally, ‘Europe’s posturing as a liberal normative power
has resulted in a strategic disconnect with China, which largely adheres to state-
centric policies’.63 With such very different political rationalities in operation
at the bilateral level, the prospects for effective regional interaction were always
modest.
The discourse of ‘Asian values’ that came to prominence in the early 1990s
can be thought of as ideational diffusion from Asia within Asia but also to
the rest of the world. While the Asian financial crisis of 1997 undermined the
potency of this (quite diverse) set of ideas,64 a renaissance is well underway.65
China’s remarkable economic ascension is increasingly seen as an alternative to a
discredited Western model, as we discuss further below.66
Fifth, the transfer of personnel is apparent with short-term staff exchange and
longer-term movements of foreign students. Transfers of ideas and practices also
occur via international task-forces and commissions; fact-finding missions and
eminent persons groups. In this regard, both ASEM and ASEF are vehicles for
sustained people-to-people exchanges and high-level official exchange to rein-
force and legitimate certain forms of policy or normative standards as best prac-
tice. It is paralleled by inter-regional think-tank and knowledge networking via
the Council for Asia Europe Cooperation (CAEC), among others. Such inter-
regional network activity remains a soft and inconclusive mode of transfer given
the vast array of other international and regional networks, dialogues and meet-
ings in which Asian elites participate. With a regional preference for a ‘habit of
dialogue’, informal diplomacy and consensus-building, it is an activity on which
a higher value is placed in Asia than in Europe. ‘The consensus values that define
Asian regionalism are solidarist and communalist ones rather than legalist and
institutionalist ones’ that typify the EU.67
62) K. Chan, ‘Images, visibility and the prospects of soft power of the EU in Asia: the case of
China’, Asia–Europe Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2012), pp. 133–147, p. 143.
63) JonathanHolslag, ‘The strategic dissonance betweenEurope andChina’,TheChinese Jour-
nal of International Politics, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 325–345, p. 325.
64) Ralph Pettman, ‘Asian perspectives on the European experience of regionalism’, Interna-
tional Politics, Vol. 47 (2010), pp. 299–305.
65) Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The lessons for smug Europe to learn from Asia’, Europe’s World
(summer 2011); available at: http://www.mahbubani.net/articles.html (accessed 31 March
2013).
66) Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate
the Twenty-first Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
67) Pettman, ‘Asian perspectives’, p. 301.
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These five quite different modalities testify to the likelihood of diverse out-
comes from policy transfer. ASEM, ASEF and their non-state counterpart
CAEC represent only a few poorly resourced vehicles of diffusion. Nevertheless,
for Asian recipients of European norms, venues like ASEM represent an even
playing field of peer-to-peer networks which allow them to engage Europe selec-
tively and reduce the potential for indirect coercive transfers endemic to asym-
metric regional relationships elsewhere in the world. Instead, Asian translators
became the critical mediators of transfer processes.
From EU Models to Asian Ways
What does this tour of inter-regional dialogues and institutions tell us about
policy transfer? First, we have contested the notion that transfer is a sequential
process that starts with (European) innovation and ends with (Asian) adoption.
Second, we have suggested that ideas and policies are transformed during the
processes of transfer. Indeed, it is precisely this process of mediation and norm
localisation that has given East Asia generally and Southeast Asia in particular
its distinctive, non-European style patterns of regional cooperation and institu-
tionalisation.Third, we suggest below thatmultiple sources of lessons, combined
with endogenous policy learning, also alter norm brokerage and policy transfer
aspirations into a multi-faceted translation dynamic.
The idea of policy translation has gained traction to account for divergence
and hybridisation, adaption andmutation. It reflects a ‘move away from thinking
of knowledge transfer as a form of technology transfer or dissemination, reject-
ing if only by implication its mechanistic assumptions and its model of linear
messaging from A to B’.68 In transmission processes between Europe and Asia,
and vice versa, ideas about regional models are disassembled and reconstituted.
Translation is a series of interpretations and disruptions that ‘occur in the spaces
between the “creation”, the “transmission” and the “interpretation” or “reception”
of policy meanings’.69
Translation stresses the complexity of context and the need for interpreta-
tion or experimentalism in the assemblage of policy. This approach undermines
assumptions of undiluteddichotomous diffusionor unmediated import of trans-
ferred ideas. In otherwords, policy learning is not synonymouswith policy adop-
tion. Instead, policy lessons can help crystallise what ideas and policy paths deci-
sion-makers do not wish to follow. Many policies are not transferable because
68) Richard Freeman, ‘What is translation?’Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate
and Practice, Vol. 5 (2009), pp. 429–447, p. 429.
69) Lendvai and Stubbs, ‘Policies as translation’, p. 175.
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they have grown out of the socio-legal, educational and political systems of their
host state and are neither ideologically nor culturally proximate. The path of
Asian regionalism very much substantiates the limits of treating the European
model as a hermetically sealed export.
Without a doubt, the EU is the most institutionally sophisticated and devel-
oped model of regional integration. But it is not the only model. For exam-
ple, the Integration Partnership Forum provides an opportunity for ASEAN
countries to share the insights and lessons learnt from nearly 30 years of the
Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER)/Single Economic
Market (SEM) journey, and to consider possible implications for their own pro-
cess of economic integration.70 Other regions also provide a source of inspi-
ration and potential emulation of specific practices or policies: Mercosur, the
SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity (SADC) and the SouthAsia Asso-
ciation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), among many others. Instead of
a closed channel of bilateral diffusion between the established EU exemplar
and other nascent regions, there are competing visions and lessons to be learnt
from other regions at different stages and trajectories of development. Rather
than simple selection of one model, synthesis also occurs. This ‘transversal pol-
icy transfer’ is occurring concurrently at bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral
levels.71
Even if there are cases of straightforward transmission of policy fromone juris-
diction to another, the transfer does not create a cryogenically preserved pol-
icy for evermore. At some point, the policy transfer process ends and endoge-
nous forces of mutation take over. Local ownership becomes more pronounced
and the indigenisation of policy results. Logics of appropriateness entail grad-
ual adjustment and modifications that lead to different outcomes than may have
originally been envisaged. Existing policy processes and socio-cultural condi-
tions alter imported ideas. What once may have been a European idea becomes
an Asian practice. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) superficially resembles
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in that it is ostensibly dedicated to pro-
moting regional stability, but its modus operandi is predicated on the ASEAN
70) CER-ASEAN Integration Partnership Forum; see: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and
-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Asean/1-Integration
-Partnership-Forum/0-IPF-index.php (accessed 31 March 2013).
71) ‘Transversal policy cooperation’ is borrowed from euGRASP Final Integrative Report,
The EU as a Global–Regional Actor in Security and Peace (Bruges: EU, 2012), p. 21: ‘Hence,
despite the many official declarations about the EU’s preference for interregional relations, a
closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing and at times
competing models of external relations—resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral and
interregional policies.’
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Way and it eschews binding agreements in favour of face-saving consensus. In
short, Asians ‘turned their back on the European experience’.72 That the ARF
is largely incapable of addressing Asia’s more challenging strategic environment
is not the point: the ARF’s impotence is partly what makes it acceptable to its
Asian members, a reality to which its non-Asian participants must accommo-
date themselves.73
Learning to build regions can also be endogenous. It is feasible to innovate
intra-regionally via policy and research networks working on region specific
problems. To take but one example, the ASEAN Institutes of International and
Strategic Studies have networked regionally for three-plus decades, as strong
advocates for region-building, and are regarded by many observers as the early
norm brokers or champions for the ARF.74 More generally, the density of re-
gional institutions has grown appreciably as the number of meetings, commit-
tees, working groups and so forth has increased under the consultative and infor-
mal ‘ASEAN Way’ decision-making style—that is, ‘soft regionalism’.75
It is undeniable that processes of inter-regional engagement and learning have
taken place. ASEANhas drawn upon the EU’s Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives to design its own Committee of Permanent Representatives.76 How-
ever, much else regarding both the institutional features, powers, norms, capac-
ity and practices of ASEAN remains distinctly different from the EU. Conver-
gence around European-style regional integration as a universal ideal cannot be
regarded as isomorphic or inevitable, in the structural sense, nornecessarily desir-
able. Indeed, Asian political leaders have considered the EU, but more so as a
‘reference case’ rather than as their destiny.77
This stance towards normdiffusion and transfer of policymoves the analytical
focus from the idea—the EU—as themain source of explanation, one inevitably
propelling change, to an explanatory position where the acceptance of the idea
is more politically relevant than the idea itself. Policy innovations elsewhere
72) Pettman, ‘Asian perspectives’, p. 300.
73) Ralf Emmers and See SengTan, ‘TheASEANRegional Forum and preventive diplomacy:
built to fail?’, Asian Security, Vol. 7 (2011), pp. 44–60.
74) Anthony Milner, ‘Reconciling Asean + 3 and East Asia Summit’, in Stephen Leong (ed.),
Peace in the Pacific: Confronting the Issues (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 2007).
75) Z. Zhao, ‘Soft versus structured regionalism: organizational forms of cooperation in Asia-
Pacific’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 12 (1998), pp. 96–134.
76) Jetschke and Murray, ‘Diffusing regional integration’, pp. 174–191.
77) RichardHiggott andMartinaTimmermans, ‘Institutionalizing EastAsia: learning lessons
fromEurope on regionalism, regionalization, identity and leadership’, inMartinaTimmerman
and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (eds), Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps towards Global
Governance (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2008), pp. 43–62.
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are not sufficient condition for another jurisdiction to adopt the same policy.
As we have argued, factors internal to a system can be a more powerful deter-
minant of what is adopted than external influences. For European norm brokers
to be effective, there must also be a politically receptive audience of Asian norm
takers who consider the EU legitimate andworthy of emulation. Even if interme-
diaries such as scholars, policy thinkers and opinion leaders mutate policy ideas
from elsewhere in a process of policy translation, the local context and dynam-
ics within the importing jurisdiction is crucial in deciding which, if any, ideas
are adopted. In East Asia it was not so much a case of the EU model being con-
strained or failing to be transferred. Rather, the EUmodel lacked resonance, rele-
vance and—perhaps most crucially—indigenous champions. The contemporary
problems ofEurope since 2007have donemuch toundo the idea of theEuropean
Union as a successful project of economic and political development. Instead, in
many elite quarters of East Asia there are ‘lessons for smug Europe to learn from
Asia’.78
The rise of China and the economic vitality of many other Asian economies
boosts the nascent counter-discourse of the ‘Beijing consensus’ that portrays
China, or the EastAsianmode of economic development, as themodel du jour.79
ThatAsia’s economic crisis actually had an integrative rather than a disintegrative
effect on regionalism in East Asia is also another unfortunate point of compari-
son with the beleaguered EU.80
While Europeans seek to ‘westernize’ Asians, offering theEuropeanUnion as a blueprint
for how they should construct an international community in their part of the world,
Asians now offer their own models as to how to ‘easternize’ European regionalist prac-
tices and how they should present themselves to the world.81
To date, scholarly discussion of Europeanisation and EU-isation as a form of pol-
icy transfer or diffusion beyond Europe has generally been about the outward
projection of ideas, rules, policies and approaches without a full assessment of
either policy reception or, more importantly today, the reverse flow of ideas and
models out of Asia to the rest of the world. As discussed in the concluding sec-
tion, receptivity and translation of models of regional integration is conditioned
by timing and local context as well as geopolitical considerations. In this regard,
78) Mahbubani, ‘The lessons for smug Europe’.
79) M. Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of
the Western World (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
80) M. Beeson, ‘Crisis dynamics and regionalism: East Asia in comparative perspective’, The
Pacific Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2011), pp. 357–374.
81) Pettman, ‘Asian perspectives’, p. 299.
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our analysis marries the structural preferences of historical institutionalism with
the agency-driven explanations of policy transfer to argue that models (institu-
tions) are not inherently persuasive butmust be pushed (via socialisation and/or
incentivisation or conditionality) in conducive circumstances.
Who’s Influencing Whom? Post-crisis Inter- and Intra-regional Politics
In the wake of the recent economic crisis which has affected the EU so badly,
its reputation as a model to avoid rather than emulate is likely to be entrenched
in Asia. European failures have generated widespread criticism, a lack of recep-
tivity, through to outright rejection of the model. Some are drawing attention
to what they claim is ‘the wisdom of ASEAN in moving towards open archi-
tecture regional reforms, instead of the European-style rigidly legal multilateral
fora’.82 Nevertheless, Europe’s troubles are likely to continue to influence the
course of regional development in Asia, but not in ways Europeans might have
hoped. The possible consequences are by turns technical, ideational and geopo-
litical.
Paradoxically, the greatest catalyst for greater regional cooperation in East
Asia was the financial crisis of the late 1990s and the most celebrated exam-
ple of regional development has been in the area of monetary cooperation.83
The so-called Chiang-Mai Initiative (CMI) was the high point of post-crisis
regional cooperation and a number of important innovations were proposed,
especially in the development of currency swap mechanisms and overall mon-
etary cooperation.84 However, when faced with its first major test in the form of
the 2008–2009 ‘global’ financial crisis, ‘the CMI failed abysmally’.85
In reality, the global financial crisis was—in its initial phase—anything but.
Before Europe’s sovereign debt problems threatened to ratchet up the scale of the
economic crisis to genuinely global proportions, it was largely a northern, even
a transatlantic, affair.86 One of the principal reasons Asia remained largely unaf-
fectedwas because of the apparent durability ofChina’s unprecedentedhistorical
rise. Despite growing concerns about China’s economic stability, it has rapidly
82) K. Mahbubani, ‘The new Asian great game’, Financial Times (23 November 2011).
83) Duck-koo Chung and Barry Eichengreen, ‘Exchange rate arrangements for emerging East
Asia’, in D.-k. Chung and B. Eichengreen (eds), Toward an East Asian Exchange Rate Regime
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2007), pp. 1–21.
84) William Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
85) Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill, ‘TheAsian and global financial crises: consequences for
East Asian regionalism’, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 17 (2011), pp. 133–149, p. 141.
86) Breslin, ‘East Asia and the global/transatlantic/Western crisis’.
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become the most important economic partner for most of its neighbours and
a pivotal source of regional economic growth and development. Whether the
Asian region can remain decoupled from North America’s or Europe’s troubles
looks less certain as the latter continue to intensify. What is certain is that few
in Asia are looking to the political systems of either the US or the EU for inspi-
ration when it comes to responding to the crisis. On the contrary, democratic
politics in both Europe and America has become increasingly synonymous with
partisanship, incompetence and, in Europe’s case, the resurgence of nationalist
interests.
This not only undermines the EU’s ability to play the role of normative exem-
plar anddevelopmental paradigm, but it also opens the door to alternatives: it has
become fashionable to talk of the ‘Beijing consensus’ and China’s ‘soft power’.87
Even so, there are good reasons for thinking that the ‘China model’ is—like the
EU—sui generis and not transferable.88 Nevertheless, China’s rise is important
for reasons that merit spelling out.
First, its response to the initial crisis in 2008 when it rapidly unleashed a
massive stimulus package through the state-controlled financial sector stood
in marked contrast to the experience of the Europeans and Americans, whose
efforts were largely confined to bailing out their own poorly regulated banks.
Second, China’s efforts not only saved its neighbours from succumbing to extra-
regional problems, but they provided a strikingly effective alternative to the sort
of neo-liberal prescriptions that had never been enthusiastically embraced in the
region.89 Third, China’s trade surpluses and currency manipulation have led it to
accumulate the world’s largest foreign currency reserves and it is consequently a
central part of the international political economy.TheUS is already increasingly
dependent on continuing inflows of Chinesemoney to underwrite its budgetary
position. The result is a shift in the international balance of economic power. As
HillaryClinton inadvertently admittedwhen askedwhether shewould ‘stand up
to China’, she replied, ‘How do you deal toughly with your banker?’90
If the US cannot tell China what to do, what chance has the EU? China is
influential not because its model necessarily attracts admirers, but because its
sheer economic weight translates into real power. Wen Jiabao’s suggestion that
the EU might want to grant China ‘market economy’ status and thus minimise
87) Joshua Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).
88) Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?’
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19 (2010), pp. 419–436.
89) Walter, Governing Finance.
90) Ewen MacAskill, ‘WikiLeaks: Hillary Clinton’s question: how can we stand up to Bei-
jing?’, Guardian (4 December 2010).
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trade restrictions on Chinese firms if the EU wants its help is a revealing indica-
tion of which way the winds of international influence and power are currently
blowing.91 The unpleasant reality for policy-makers in Brussels and Washington
is that it is they who may have to do the adjusting and ‘getting their houses in
order’, as Premier Wen bluntly put it. The adjustment process will be made even
more difficult because of the way power is exercised in some of the rising powers.
The rise of ‘state capitalism’ is not unique to China but a more widespread
development that presents amajor challenge to the establishedWestern-inspired
order of free markets and democratic politics. For state capitalists,
the ultimatemotive is not economic (maximising growth) but political (maximising the
state’s power and the leadership’s chances of survival). This is a form of capitalism but
one in which the state acts as the dominant economic player and uses markets primarily
for political gain.92 [Emphasis in original.]
Not all of Asia subscribes to the state capitalism model, but the rather utopian
notion that the EU’s good example might catalyse an inevitable convergence on
Western political and economic practices is becoming increasingly implausible.
Despite the EU’s current travails, its track record remains substantial and pro-
foundly impressive—if fornoother reason than its very existencehas been instru-
mental in transforming Europe’s security environment and giving real credibility
to claims about the pacifying impact of economic integration.93 And yet its style
of regional integration had relatively little impact on Asia. The principal reason
is that both the internal sources of difference or divergence alongside the forces
of resistance to external influence in Asia remain strong. East Asian regional-
ism looks and functions differently partly because it developed in a distinctive
East Asian context with all of the contingent historical realities that implies, and
partly because the forces that shaped initial cooperation in East Asia and Europe
were different and less consequential: Cold War geopolitics in Europe had a
much larger impact than inAsia.Many policy-makers in East Asia have no desire
for the sort of powerful, potentially intrusive threats to domestic sovereignty that
are seen to distinguish Europe. Whatever many Europeans may have thought
about the inherent superiority of the EU, there has been little appetite to repli-
cate it in Asia.
91) Jamil Anderlini and Lifen Zhang, ‘Wen sets preconditions to help Europe’. Financial
Times (14 September 2011).
92) Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corpo-
rations? (New York: Penguin, 2010), p. 5.
93) Erik Gartzke, ‘The capitalist peace’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 1
(2007), pp. 166–191.
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Is the EUmodel likely to becomemore or less influential inAsia and elsewhere
in the future? Although it gives us no pleasure to say so, we suspect that the
EU’s influence is likely to diminish in Asia, and elsewhere for that matter. Of
course, if the EU can overcome some of the formidable economic, political and
legitimacy problems that currently confront it,94 this will undoubtedly enhance
its standing. But any potential influence will be filtered through contingent local
circumstances and conditions. If the Asian economies continue to prosper while
Europe languishes, it is unlikely to prove an attractive rolemodel. If Asia sufferers
a severe downturn, the preconditions for European-style cooperationmay simply
not exist. Eitherway,we shouldnot expect thatEurope’s influencewill necessarily
increase—whatever its normative attractions may be.
94) DavidMarsh, Europe’s Deadlock:How the Euro Crisis Could Be Solved—andWhy ItWon’t
Happen (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013).
